To Race or to Place?

Jeremy T. Schwartz, Justin P. Isaacs and Anthony M. Carilli
Additional contact information
Jeremy T. Schwartz: Hampden-Sydney College
Justin P. Isaacs: Hampden-Sydney College
Anthony M. Carilli: Hampden-Sydney College

Journal of Sports Economics, 2007, vol. 8, issue 6, 633-641

Abstract: The authors use race-level data from 2003 and 2004 to test von Allmen's hypothesis regarding the inefficiency of the NASCAR reward system, where compensation is in the form of points that are accumulated throughout a season. They define drivers as two types, skilled and unskilled. Skilled drivers are hypothesized to be less aggressive than unskilled drivers because they are more productive given the same effort. Accordingly, an unskilled driver must be more aggressive than a skilled one to gain more compensation. The authors test this assertion empirically by modeling accidents as a proxy for aggression. They find that drivers who demonstrate skill in earlier races are less likely to get into accidents in subsequent races, suggesting there is a skill-level difference among drivers.

Keywords: tournament structure; sabotage; NASCAR; logit analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1527002506294944 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:8:y:2007:i:6:p:633-641

DOI: 10.1177/1527002506294944

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Sports Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().