French Football

Wladimir Andreff
Additional contact information
Wladimir Andreff: University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne

Journal of Sports Economics, 2007, vol. 8, issue 6, 652-661

Abstract: This article contends that a French football exception is not an absent financial crisis but its hidden shape because of undisciplined club behavior and a lack of transparency and disclosure. French football is characterized by a lax financial management and a soft-budget constraint at the club level. The latter results from a weak governance structure in the league and clubs. Shareholders behave as non-profit-seeking investors or patrons. The arms race to enroll the most efficient players fuels wage inflation that is hardly balanced by newly emerging sources of finance. The more a club is able to attract broadcast revenues, the more likely it is to be in the red. Policy recommendations include strengthening the governance structure, restoring financial discipline, and defining compulsory thresholds for some clubs' financial ratios.

Keywords: budget constraint; disclosure; finance; football; governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1527002506297021 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:8:y:2007:i:6:p:652-661

DOI: 10.1177/1527002506297021

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Sports Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().