Celebrity Misbehavior in the NBA

Todd D. Kendall
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Todd D. Kendall: Clemson University, tkendal@clemson.edu

Journal of Sports Economics, 2008, vol. 9, issue 3, 231-249

Abstract: I compare and contrast theories of why NBA players misbehave on the court, then test them empirically. I find evidence that earnings are positively correlated with misbehavior and that both absolute and relative salary matter. For instance, a player who is highest paid on his team misbehaves roughly 7% more than one who is second-highest paid, even at the same salary level. This relative effect I interpret as due to lack of good substitutes for top players. I also find some evidence that personal preferences may be important in understanding misbehavior, but no evidence that immaturity or peer effects are important determinants of misbehavior in the NBA.

Keywords: celebrity; basketball; technical fouls; substitutability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:9:y:2008:i:3:p:231-249

DOI: 10.1177/1527002507301526

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