Blame, Game Theory and Economic policy

Paul Anand

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1998, vol. 10, issue 1, 111-123

Abstract: Two case-studies are used to suggest that political sensitivity to blame has important consequences for the design and success of economic policy. The note begins with some remarks indicating how blame might be modelled in the standard noncooperative game-theoretic framework.

Keywords: blame; counterfactuals; economic policy; game theory; political psychology; poll tax; rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:111-123

DOI: 10.1177/0951692898010001005

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