The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules

Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1998, vol. 10, issue 1, 125-142

Abstract: European Union Member States increasingly draw attention to the choice between and within various decision rules. Two prominent approaches, relative voting power studies and spatial models, assess the choice within the standard, cooperation, and co-decision procedures. However, they cannot sufficiently explain the Member States' choice of these rules. In this article, we present our model on absolute inclusiveness and relative decisiveness referring to two aspects of Member States' choice: their absolute chances to be incorporated in collective decision-making and their relative chances to be decisive actors thereby. We argue that the combination of both power aspects gives insight into the choice of rules, and we apply both indices to the actual power distributions in the Council of Members.

Keywords: absolute inclusiveness; decision rules; European Union; game theory; power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:125-142

DOI: 10.1177/0951692898010001006

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