Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences

Dean Lacy and Emerson M. S. Niou

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1998, vol. 10, issue 1, 89-110

Abstract: We derive Nash equilibrium candidate strategies in a double-member district election when voters have nonseparable preferences for candidates in a single-dimensional policy space. When candidates are elected simultaneously, nonseparable voter preferences create multiple equilibria, including some in which candidates adopt extreme positions. The results are robust to limited voter uncertainty about candidate interaction in the legislature. Nonseparable voter preferences create incentives for the formation of political parties and disincentives for candidates to moderate their positions.

Keywords: elections; equilibrium; nonseparable preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951692898010001004 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:89-110

DOI: 10.1177/0951692898010001004

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().