The Strength of Weak Ties in Lobbying Networks

Daniel P. Carpenter, Kevin M. Esterling and David M. J. Lazer

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1998, vol. 10, issue 4, 417-444

Abstract: How does policy information flow through Washington `issue networks'? And how does information flow determine which lobbyists get access in policy-making? Drawing upon the `strength of weak ties' argument, the authors argue that policy information passes more through acquaintances (`weak ties') than through close, trusted, contacts (`strong ties'). They support this argument in an analysis of data on lobbying networks in health-care policy-making in the 1970s and 1980s. The statistical analyses show that access to policy-makers in Washington is network-autocorrelated : a lobbyist's access depends upon the access of other lobbyists s/he knows. The results demonstrate the importance of weak ties as a restricted form of `social capital' in policy-making.

Keywords: health politics; informational lobbying; issue networks; network autocorrelation; weak ties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:10:y:1998:i:4:p:417-444

DOI: 10.1177/0951692898010004003

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