Suppressing Shays' Rebellion

Michael J. G. Cain and Keith L. Dougherty

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, vol. 11, issue 2, 233-260

Abstract: Under the Articles of Confederation, the American states frequently failed to pay their requisitions to the national government, sapping it of revenue. This paper explains the failure to raise revenue from the states by analyzing the system of requisitions in the context of Shays' Rebellion. Shays' Rebellion is of particular interest because it illustrates the clear conflict between common state interests and constitutional obligations on the one hand and the incentives to withhold contributions on the other. Our analysis shows that states had sufficient resources to fund a national army but did not contribute these resources to the nation. With adequate revenues within the states, the flaws of the Articles of Confederation were clearly revealed. The Articles failed to prevent free-riding among states, contributed to the disharmony of the union, and ultimately prevented Congress from accomplishing its constitutional tasks. These problems were not unique to the Articles. They result from voluntary requisition systems in general.

Keywords: collective action; constitutional design; Shays' Rebellion; step goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:233-260

DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011002005

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