Relevance of Voting Power

Jan-Erik Lane and Sven Berg

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, vol. 11, issue 3, 309-320

Abstract: Democratic decision-making in groups requires institutions that aggregate the preference of the choice participants into a collective choice under the restriction that no player is a dictator. Constitutions deliver alternative rules for democratic decision-making, the consequences of which are best analysed using cooperative game theory. The emergence of a power index literature in the 1980s reflects the relevance of this type of modelling of institutions for groups like the European Union, stating modalities of power for the players.

Keywords: constitutional analysis; cooperative game theory; power index method; power modalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:309-320

DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003002

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