Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making?

Manfred Holler and Mika Widgrén
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mika Tapani Widgrén

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, vol. 11, issue 3, 321-330

Abstract: In this paper we argue that spatial voting games and power index models are not necessarily exclusive ways to analyse EU decision-making. We find that the two main criticisms pointed out by scholars of spatial voting games, namely that power indices do not take into account preferences or the role of the agenda-setter, are not fully valid as spatial voting games deal with complete whereas power indices deal with incomplete contracts. Ideas for combining the two so far very opposite views are then discussed.

Keywords: European Union; game theory; power indices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:321-330

DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003003

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