Commons Problems, Collective Action and Efficiency

Sara Singleton

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, vol. 11, issue 3, 367-391

Abstract: The article explores three interrelated questions related to institutional design: the roles of states and communities in creating and maintaining institutions designed to resolve commons problems arising from the use of natural resource systems; the substantive content of such institutions with respect to allocative efficiency and equity; and effects on allocative efficiency of the interactive relationship between, on the one hand, institutions designed specifically to inhibit free-riding, and on the other, broader social arrangements such as marriage customs or membership in a community, which create expectations of stable, ongoing relations between parties across a number of issue areas.

Keywords: co-management; collective action; common pool resources; institutional design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:367-391

DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003006

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