The Transition from Authoritarian Rule

Daniel Sutter

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2000, vol. 12, issue 1, 67-89

Abstract: I investigate conditions under which a regime and opposition can negotiate the democratic transformation of an authoritarian government using an extensive form game of perfect information. An early final decision by the regime to hold elections, which can be accomplished by delegating this decision to reformist softliners, facilitates transition. The relationship between regime strength and the potential for a negotiated democratization is quite complicated. The weakening of a regime as it relaxes repression, for instance, can block a negotiated transition: a regime can be strong enough to hold on to power but too weak to negotiate. The possibility of a coup by regime supporters following an electoral defeat can, but does not necessarily, foreclose a peaceful transition.

Keywords: democratization; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:67-89

DOI: 10.1177/0951692800012001003

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