Definitions, Evidence, and Policy

Arend Lijphart

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2000, vol. 12, issue 4, 425-431

Abstract: The concept of consociational democracy - synonymous with the less polysyllabic and more readily understandable term power-sharing democracy - can be defined in terms of the four elements of grand coalition, autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto, and it is preferable not to narrow it by including plural society as a fifth element. It is closely related to, but not coterminous with, the concept of consensus democracy. Both can be used for empirical as well as normative purposes. The comparative evidence shows convincingly that consociational and consensus democracy can make a vital contribution to democratic stability in deeply divided societies - a finding that has significant policy implications.

Keywords: consensus democracy; consociational theory; majoritarianism; policy relevance; power-sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:12:y:2000:i:4:p:425-431

DOI: 10.1177/0951692800012004003

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