Fair Allocation and Re-Weighting of Votes and Voting Power in the EU before and after the Next Enlargement

Matthias Sutter

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2000, vol. 12, issue 4, 433-449

Abstract: Laruelle and Widgrén (1998) have raised the question of whether the allocation of voting power in the EU is fair. This paper extends some of their results insofar as (1) it deals with the consequences if the square root rule - which is the basis for calculating fair shares of voting power - is not fully applicable; (2) it calculates voting weights that lead to a fair allocation of voting power in the EU Council; and (3) it considers the effects of an EU enlargement on the fair allocation of voting power.

Keywords: Banzhaf Index; collective decision-making; European integration; voting power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:12:y:2000:i:4:p:433-449

DOI: 10.1177/0951692800012004004

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