Myths and Meanings of Voting Power

Manfred J. Holler

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2001, vol. 13, issue 1, 107-110

Abstract: This is a reply to Dan Felsenthal's and Moshé Machover's verdict on the Holler-Widgrén contribution to the Symposium on `Power Indices and the European Union' in the July 1999 issue of this Journal. It questions the benefits of discussing the game-theoretical nature of power indices and argues that the public good index represents I-power, and not P-power. Moreover, it defends the application of the permutation model to represent preferences behind a veil of ignorance.

Keywords: I-Power; P-Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:107-110

DOI: 10.1177/0951692801013001006

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