Game Theory and Juries

Howard Margolis

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2001, vol. 13, issue 4, 425-435

Abstract: Recent work on game theory and juries reaches the startling result that making convictions easier (by easing the requirement for unanimity) would make false convictions rarer. Only the guilty would be put at increased risk. The note explains why the result is contingent on a quirk in the mathematical analysis.

Keywords: cognition; convictions; game theory; juries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:13:y:2001:i:4:p:425-435

DOI: 10.1177/0951692801013004005

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