A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization

Leonard Wantchekon and Zvika Neeman
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Leonard Wantchekon: New York University, Department of Economics at Yale University
Zvika Neeman: Boston University, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2002, vol. 14, issue 4, 439-464

Abstract: We model the transition from a chaotic status quo to a more orderly political regime as a two-stage game involving two warring factions and the citizens. The warring factions move first and decide the form of government by (1) inviting an external arbitrator, (2) choosing the people as arbitrator, i.e. democratizing or (3) maintaining the status quo. We analyze the conditions under which democracy is likely to emerge as the outcome of the game. We show that citizens prefer democracy because it generates a sociopolitical order that protects them against ‘banditry’ and expropriation. Because the citizens’ actions generate positive externalities, incentives for democratization are generated in part by the fact that protection against expropriation under democracy also indirectly benefits the warring factions.

Keywords: civil wars; democratization; game theoretical models of social conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:14:y:2002:i:4:p:439-464

DOI: 10.1177/095162902774006822

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