Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

Helmut Bester and Kai Konrad

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2005, vol. 17, issue 2, 199-215

Abstract: Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.

Keywords: easy targets; timing of conflict; war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629805050860 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:2:p:199-215

DOI: 10.1177/0951629805050860

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().