A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union

Fabio Franchino
Additional contact information
Fabio Franchino: School of Public Policy, University College London, f.franchino@ucl.ac.uk

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2005, vol. 17, issue 2, 217-247

Abstract: This article develops a formal model of the politics of delegation in the European Union (EU) incorporating key institutional features: the legislative-executive role of the Commission, the legislative-executive role of the members of the Council of Ministers, the possible implementation of European policies by different national administrations and the variety of EU decision rules. The model generates propositions on how decision rules, policy conflict and the status quo affect the delegation of powers to the Commission and to national authorities. It demonstrates how qualified majority voting and, in some cases, codecision work as a commitment technology by facilitating the adoption of legislation that restrains national authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to the Commission and increases its discretion. More generally, it shows that, first, the negative relation between conflict and discretion may not hold in the case of many administrators and a high threshold for decision-making; and, second, a less demanding bargaining environment in the legislature may work in favor of an administrator with agenda-setting power.

Keywords: commitment; delegation; European Union; legislative procedures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629805050861 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:2:p:217-247

DOI: 10.1177/0951629805050861

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().