When Do War Chests Deter?

Jay Goodliffe
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Jay Goodliffe: Brigham Young University, goodliffe@byu.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2005, vol. 17, issue 2, 249-277

Abstract: I present a repeated election model of campaign fund-raising and spending where the incumbent may use money not spent in one election for a future election, i.e. may create a war chest. I characterize the conditions where an incumbent creates a war chest for deterrence. The strongest incumbents do not create the largest war chests since they deter the challenger on their own. It is the weaker incumbents who must create the larger war chests to deter the challenger.

Keywords: campaign finance; challenger entry; deterrence; incumbent strength; war chest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:2:p:249-277

DOI: 10.1177/0951629805050862

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