Improving the Explanatory Power of Bargaining Models

Torsten J. Selck
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Torsten J. Selck: University of Groningen, T.J.Selck@let.rug.nl

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2005, vol. 17, issue 3, 371-375

Abstract: Focusing on recent studies of European Union legislative decision-making, this research note evaluates the current literature that attempts to improve the explanatory power of bargaining models by integrating game-theoretic spatial models with micro-level data gained from expert interviews or from document analyses.

Keywords: dimensionality; European Union; game theory; legislative decision-making; spatial models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:3:p:371-375

DOI: 10.1177/0951629805052885

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