Investigating the Dynamics of Political Compromise

Alan E. Wiseman
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Alan E. Wiseman: Political Science at the Ohio State Universitywiseman.69@osu.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2005, vol. 17, issue 4, 497-514

Abstract: Using data on party representation for the Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees from the 47th–103rd Congresses, I test the implications of a recently developed theory by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul. Their theory predicts that, in any particular Congress, majority and minority party representation on committees should be a function of the maximum political strength enjoyed by the majority party during the entire period for which it has held majority status up to, and including, that Congress. I refute this hypothesis and find that for any given Congress, majority party representation on committees is determined, rather, by the current political strength of the majority party. These findings speak to broad questions about our understanding of the role of the minority party in legislative organization and lawmaking in legislative politics, and in the US Congress, in particular.

Keywords: bargaining; committees; legislative organization; parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:4:p:497-514

DOI: 10.1177/0951629805056898

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