Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions

Eduardo Alemán and Thomas Schwartz
Additional contact information
Eduardo Alemán: Department of Political Science, University of Houston, ealeman2@uh.edu
Thomas Schwartz: Department of Political Science, UCLA, tschwartz@polisci.ucla.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2006, vol. 18, issue 1, 98-120

Abstract: A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of ‘presidential power’, and regional peculiarities turn out to have been rather well designed to encourage democratic responsibility and executive-legislative agreement more than executive dominance or interbranch deadlock.

Keywords: constitutions; executive veto; extensive game forms; paradoxes; parliamentary procedures; presidential systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:1:p:98-120

DOI: 10.1177/0951629806059598

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