Dyadic Myth and Monadic Advantage

Xinyuan Dai
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Xinyuan Dai: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Department of Political Sciences, 361 Lincoln Hall, 702 South Wright Street, MC-452, Urbana, IL 61801-3696 xdai@uiuc.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2006, vol. 18, issue 3, 267-297

Abstract: How do democratic institutions influence international trade policy? This article highlights conceptual challenges confronting the study of democracy and trade. Using a game theoretic model, I aim to spell out the precise effect of democratic legislative constraints on trade. In contrast to the dyadic argument that legislative constraints enable democracies to better cooperate with each other to liberalize trade, I argue that effective legislative constraints give a democracy a monadic bargaining advantage in international trade negotiations. This advantage is associated with a lower level of trade barriers abroad and a higher level of trade barriers at home. Thus, rather than dyadically cooperative, a democracy may be monadically competitive.

Keywords: democratic advantage; international trade; legislative constraints; two-level game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:3:p:267-297

DOI: 10.1177/0951629806064348

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