Game-theoretic Consistency and International Relations

Roger Myerson

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2006, vol. 18, issue 4, 416-433

Abstract: De Figueiredo et al. (this issue) have argued that, to model the American Revolution, game-theoretic consistency assumptions need to be relaxed. In response, we review the methodological rationale for such consistency assumptions, and we find a possible exception in international relations. Any inconsistent theory of games would be invalidated by rational players who are intelligent enough to understand it. Furthermore, within any society, culturally defined principles of justice and legitimate authority serve to generate consistent expectations in games, and these coordinating principles are strengthened by socially constructing them as corollaries of universal natural law. Such universalization of local justice and authority, although a force for local consistency, is a force for inconsistency of beliefs in international relations. In new situations that transcend the recognized domain of international boundaries, people in each society may systematically underestimate the extent to which other societies hold different views of legitimate justice.

Keywords: Bayesian model; common knowledge; inconsistent beliefs; self-confirming equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:4:p:416-433

DOI: 10.1177/0951629806067452

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