Rational Choices as Social Norms

Dimitri Landa
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Dimitri Landa: 726 Broadway, 7th floor, Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA dimitri.landa@nyu.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2006, vol. 18, issue 4, 434-453

Abstract: This article develops an account of a theory of rational choice based on the conception of rationality as a normatively justified correspondence between interests and choices. In this conception, rationality is best thought of as a property not of individual actions, but of a complex two-level phenomenon comprised of the social justification of behavioral norms and of the everyday choices made under these norms.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; norms; rational choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:4:p:434-453

DOI: 10.1177/0951629806067453

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