Rational Choice Epistemology and Belief Formation in Mass Politics

Eric S. Dickson
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Eric S. Dickson: 726 Broadway, 7th floor, Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USAeric.dickson@nyu.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2006, vol. 18, issue 4, 454-497

Abstract: This article begins with a general discussion of the epistemology of rational choice, and argues that there are important questions in political science for which rational choice theory is not a particularly useful epistemic tool. It is further argued that part of the problem lies with the particular vision of methodological individualism that is inherent in the use of classical rational choice assumptions in game theoretic models. An alternative approach that endogenizes the way in which people form beliefs is then advocated as a potential solution to this problem, both as a means to expand the substantive reach of optimizing theories in political science, as well as a way of incorporating more psychological realism into models of political behavior. Two novel models allowing actors within political contexts to form beliefs in endogenous ways are then presented and discussed.

Keywords: belief evolution; bounded rationality; mass political behavior; preference formation; psychology of groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:4:p:454-497

DOI: 10.1177/0951629806067454

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