 Competing Explanations for Bureaucratic PreferencesAndrew B. Whitford Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2007, vol. 19, issue 3, 219-247 Abstract: This study defines and compares three broad theories that seek to explain bureaucratic preferences. I first argue that each of these explanations is complex — that no single measurable attribute encapsulates the entire theory. Second, I argue that these explanations are non-nested — that at least one attribute representing a given theory cannot be expressed as resulting from attributes that represent one of the other theories. Based on the theory of comparisons of non-nested models, I assess these three competing explanations with the Likelihood Dominance Criterion, an approach for assessing the total explanatory power of a given theory relative to that offered by other theories. The comparisons take place in the context of the bureaucratic implementation of policies governing the remediation of hazardous waste at the state level in the United States. The comparisons show that bureaucratic preferences are best explained by the organizational capacity and constraints explanation rather than more proximate political and task environment theories. In total, the agency's rules, capacity, and characteristics form a better total explanation of the observed variance in bureaucratic preferences than either proximate state politics or the agency's task environment. Keywords: bureaucracy; model selection; organization; political control; preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:19:y:2007:i:3:p:219-247 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics |
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