Justice Preferences and the Arrow Problem

Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer
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Norman Frohlich: I. H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB/R3T 5V4, Canada, frohlic@ms.umanitoba.ca
Joe A. Oppenheimer: Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, USA, joppenheimer@gvpt.umd.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2007, vol. 19, issue 4, 363-390

Abstract: Arrow showed that there is no general way to aggregate non-interpersonally comparable preferences or welfare into either a sensible social choice or a social welfare measure. With majority rule the problem manifests itself as voting cycles. The standard response to this problem has been developing `spatial models' built on restricted preferences (or welfare). We develop an alternative family of solutions. By assuming a culturally accepted conception of justice within a utility function, we establish the possibility of sensible aggregate choice implementable via majority rule. Various assumptions regarding the form the utility function are discussed. Conditions for a Condorcet winner in a problem of pure redistribution are derived for a number of models. Some of the implications of this perspective for the theory of democracy are considered. Developing a normatively interesting social welfare function may require introducing normative concerns into the preferences of the individuals rather than just into the properties of the aggregation system.

Keywords: Arrow; Condorcet winner; justice; social welfare function; voting cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:19:y:2007:i:4:p:363-390

DOI: 10.1177/0951629807080774

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