The Geometry of Majority Rule

Nicholas R. Miller, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1989, vol. 1, issue 4, 379-406

Abstract: We present some basic results concerning the spatial theory of voting in such a way that the theorems and their proofs should be accessible to a broad audience of political scientists. We do this by making the presentation essentially geometrical. We present the following results in particular: Plott's `pairwise symmetry' condition for an unbeaten point; McKelvey's `global cycling' theorem; Ferejohn, McKelvey and Packel's cardioid construction for establishing bounds on a `win set'; and McKelvey's circular bound on the `uncovered set' of points.

Keywords: majority rule; spatial voting models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:379-406

DOI: 10.1177/0951692889001004001

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