Multiple Rules and the `Nesting' of Public Policies

Mark Sproule-Jones

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1989, vol. 1, issue 4, 459-477

Abstract: This article argues that any single public policy appears to `nest' within a complex configuration of interdependent and multidimensional rules and policies. It uses a `bottom up' methodology to determine those rules that act as incentive systems for the operation of a Great Lakes Port. It finds that substantial competition and rivalry exists between ports, other transportation modes, vessel owners, ship charterers and other users of the port such as recreational boaters. These conclusions differ from what might have been predicted on the basis of a state-centred and `top downward' methodological strategy.

Keywords: rules; constitutions; evaluations; competition; ports; shipping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:459-477

DOI: 10.1177/0951692889001004004

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