Effort, Intensity and Position Taking

Kathleen Bawn and Gregory Koger
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Kathleen Bawn: Department of Political Science, UCLA, Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472, kbawn@ polisci.ucla.edu
Gregory Koger: Department of Political Science, University of Miami, Box 248047, Coral Gables, FL 33143-6534, gregory.koger@gmail.com

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2008, vol. 20, issue 1, 67-92

Abstract: Effort is a crucial element of the legislative process — writing bills, forming coalitions, crafting strategies, and debating. We develop a model in which legislative decisions are the product of competitive effort by two teams, one trying to pass new legislation, and the other to block it. Teams choose effort levels based on preferences over the policy outcome, political rewards for effort, and opportunity costs, and the team that produces more effort wins. We apply this model to four cases of major legislation from the pre-cloture Senate: passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, the Ship Purchase Act of 1915, the Ship Arming bill of 1917, and the adoption of the Senate cloture rule in 1917. These cases demonstrate the value of looking beyond legislative voting and the rules that structure it, and of including effort as a key element of the legislative game.

Keywords: effort; preference intensity; obstruction; cloture; position-taking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:20:y:2008:i:1:p:67-92

DOI: 10.1177/0951629807084040

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