Still Converging? a Downsian Party System Without Polls

Emily Clough
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Emily Clough: Science, Political Research Quarterly and Electoral Studies, eclough@unt.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2008, vol. 20, issue 4, 461-476

Abstract: This article compares convergence of political parties when voters are voting strategically and when they are voting sincerely under low-information conditions. In order to examine this problem, I create a computational model of a party system, where parties are uncertain about the distribution of the electorate. In one condition of the model, voters vote sincerely; in another, voters vote strategically. It is found that when voters vote strategically parties are less likely to converge than when voters vote sincerely.

Keywords: agent-based modeling; Downs; information; median voter; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:20:y:2008:i:4:p:461-476

DOI: 10.1177/0951629808093776

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