The Leader Rule

Jean-François Laslier

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2009, vol. 21, issue 1, 113-136

Abstract: The article considers Approval Voting for a large population of voters. It is supposed that voters evaluate the relative likelihood of pairwise ties among candidates based on statistical information about candidate scores. This leads them to vote sincerely and according to a simple behavioral rule we call the `Leader Rule'. At equilibrium, if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

Keywords: Approval Voting; Condorcet; rationality; sincerity; strategic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:113-136

DOI: 10.1177/0951629808097286

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