The Structure of Heresthetical Power

Scott Moser, John W. Patty and Elizabeth Maggie Penn
Additional contact information
Scott Moser: Nuffield College, University of Oxford, scoot.moser@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
John W. Patty: Harvard University, jpatty@gov.harvar.edu
Elizabeth Maggie Penn: Harvard University, epenn@gov.harvard.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2009, vol. 21, issue 2, 139-159

Abstract: This article considers manipulation of collective choice — in such environments, a potential alternative is powerful only to the degree that its introduction can affect the collective decision. Using the Banks set (Banks, 1985), we present and characterize alternatives that can, and those that can not, affect sophisticated collective decision-making. Along with offering two substantive findings about political manipulation and a link between our results and Riker's concept of heresthetic , we define a new tournament solution concept that refines the Banks set, which we refer to as the heresthetically stable set .

Keywords: Banks set; collective choice; heresthetics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629808100761 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:139-159

DOI: 10.1177/0951629808100761

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().