Trust in the Balance

Ivan Savic and Zachary C. Shirkey
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Ivan Savic: Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 7th Floor, International Afffairs Building 420 W. 118th St., New York, NY 10027, USA, is375@columbia.edu
Zachary C. Shirkey: Political Science Department, St John Fisher College, 124 Basil Hall, 3690 East Ave, Rochester, NY 14618, USA, zshirkey@sjfc.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2009, vol. 21, issue 4, 483-507

Abstract: Realists argue that balancing occurs in response to changes to the balance of power. Recent informational approaches have focused primarily on informational asymmetries or commitment problems. The article combines these two approaches and builds on them by incorporating characteristics of the revisionist state and the potential balancer, as well as the specific challenge to the balance of power. The model confirms that informational asymmetries often lead to commitment problems, which are a necessary condition for balancing. However, whether or not informational asymmetries create commitment problems depends on both the nature of the challenger’s move and the relative power of the challenger and respondent. The article shows under what conditions balancing is likely to occur and, counter-intuitively, that less revisionist challengers are often more willing to risk being balanced against than are more aggressive challengers.

Keywords: asymmetric information; balancing; commitment problems; crisis diplomacy; learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:4:p:483-507

DOI: 10.1177/0951629809339813

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