Ballot Structure, Political Corruption, and the Performance of Proportional Representation

Daniel W. Gingerich
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Daniel W. Gingerich: University of Virginia, dwg4c@virginia.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2009, vol. 21, issue 4, 509-541

Abstract: What is the relationship between ballot structure (the manner in which citizens cast their votes) and corruption related to the financing of politics? The author develops a principal agent—model which considers how differences in ballot structure may facilitate or impede attempts by parties to utilize the public administration as a source of electoral resources. Electoral systems which concentrate political career control in the hands of party leaders, such as closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) facilitate the use of the bureaucracy in this manner, whereas electoral systems that undermine party leader control, such as preferential-list proportional representation (PLPR), make it more difficult. The difference in the two systems rests with the degree of leverage enjoyed by party leaders vis-à -vis politically oriented bureaucrats. The capacity for favoritism under CLPR permits party leaders to reward militants who have engaged in risky behavior for the party; PLPR undercuts similar attempts to reward risky behavior.

Keywords: bureaucracy; corruption; electoral rules; formal theory; Latin America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:4:p:509-541

DOI: 10.1177/0951629809339805

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