Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes

Matthew C. Stephenson and Jide O. Nzelibe
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Matthew C. Stephenson: Harvard Law School, Griswold 509, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA, mstephen@law.Harvard.edu
Jide O. Nzelibe: Northwestern University Law School, 357 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, IL 60611, USA, j-nzelibe@law.northwestern.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010, vol. 22, issue 2, 139-167

Abstract: We analyze the interaction between electoral accountability and separation-of-powers by comparing three regimes: ‘Unilateral Authority’ (the President has exclusive decision-making power); ‘Mandatory Checks’ (the President cannot change policy without congressional assent); and ‘Opt-in Checks’ (the President may seek congressional authorization or act unilaterally). We find: (1) voters use asymmetric electoral rewards and punishments to offset the risk of politician bias, but voters rely less on this blunt instrument if there are internal checks; (2) adding a veto player need not alter the ex ante likelihood of policy change; and (3) voter welfare is highest under Opt-In Checks and lowest under Unilateral Authority.

Keywords: electoral accountability; formal theory; separation of powers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:22:y:2010:i:2:p:139-167

DOI: 10.1177/0951629809359037

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