Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies

John R. Wright
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John R. Wright: Department of Political Science, 2140 Derby Hall,154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, Ohio 43210–1373

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010, vol. 22, issue 2, 217-245

Abstract: The Supreme Court’s Chevron decision raises questions about why Congress passes ambiguous statutes and why courts defer to agencies rather than impose their own interpretations. This article presents a model of policymaking where the legislature chooses strategically between an ambiguous and explicit statute, and where rulemaking and judicial review follow. The analysis reveals that when statutes are ambiguous, judges gain few policy advantages by deciding strategically on the basis of their policy preferences as opposed to simply following Chevron precedent. The results shows that legislative policy entrepreneurs can frequently advance their policy interests more successfully with ambiguous than with explicit language.

Keywords: agencies; American politics; congress; courts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:22:y:2010:i:2:p:217-245

DOI: 10.1177/0951629809359035

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