Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties

Ana Espínola-Arredondo and Félix Muñoz-García
Additional contact information
Ana Espínola-Arredondo: School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University, USA, anaespinola@wsu.edu
Félix Muñoz-García: School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University, USA
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Felix Munoz-Garcia and Ana Espinola-Arredondo

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2011, vol. 23, issue 1, 111-134

Abstract: This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and, second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ non-compliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own non-compliance costs through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that countries’ probability of joining the IEA is increasing in the free-riding benefits they can obtain from other countries’ compliance, and decreasing in the cost of not complying with the initial terms of the agreement. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough, there is no equilibrium in which all countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, however, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common observations in international negotiations.

Keywords: environmental agreements; non-binding negotiations; non-compliance cost; signaling games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties (2009)
Working Paper: Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:1:p:111-134

DOI: 10.1177/0951629810391073

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