Competition, contest, and cooperation: The analytic framework of the issue market

Simon T Franzmann
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Simon T Franzmann: University of Potsdam and University of Cologne, Germany, simon.franzmann@uni-potsdam.de

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2011, vol. 23, issue 3, 317-343

Abstract: Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters’ demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.

Keywords: cooperation; innovation; issue market; party competition; veto point (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:3:p:317-343

DOI: 10.1177/0951629811411747

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