Constituency size and stability of two-party systems

Arturas Rozenas
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Arturas Rozenas: Department of Political Science, Duke University, Durham, USA, ar71@duke.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2011, vol. 23, issue 3, 344-358

Abstract: This paper investigates how constituency size affects spatial competition in a two-party system with a new entrant. When the electorate is small, two-party systems are stable only if the following conditions hold: the candidates are neither too certain nor too uncertain about voters’ preferences; competition is sufficiently costly; and the candidates have binding policy commitments. Moreover, whenever equilibrium exists in small constituencies, the two parties are considerably polarized. In contrast, when the electorate is large, two-party equilibrium obtains under a much wider set of conditions and exhibits low polarization. The Downsian prediction of two-party convergence and the Duvergerian prediction of plurality rule leading to a two-party system are more robust in larger electorates.

Keywords: probabilistic voting; spatial competition; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:3:p:344-358

DOI: 10.1177/0951629811411752

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