Representing collective reasons for group decisions: The judgment aggregation problem revisited

Andrew Knops
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Andrew Knops: Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, a.knops@bham.ac.uk

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2011, vol. 23, issue 4, 448-462

Abstract: This article argues that the discursive dilemma and the judgement aggregation which causes it are based on a misconception of what it means for a group to give reasons for a democratic decision. Judgement aggregation analyses fail to distinguish between the procedure for determining such a decision, which should involve a vote of all group members, and the process for determining the reasons for such a decision, which should only take account of the views of the members that supported that decision. On the basis of this improved interpretation, the article advances a method for representing reasons for group decisions that is both democratic and rational, thus avoiding the choice between these apparently incompatible goals suggested by the discursive dilemma.

Keywords: decision making; democracy; Discursive dilemma; Judgement aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:4:p:448-462

DOI: 10.1177/0951629811416321

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