Public opinion and conflict in the separation of powers: Understanding the Honduran coup of 2009

Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson and Joseph Daniel Ura
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Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson: Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, USA
Joseph Daniel Ura: Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, USA

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2013, vol. 25, issue 1, 105-127

Abstract: Formal constitutional systems of separated powers often fail to sustain meaningful systems of checks and balances in presidential-style democracies. What conditions support balance in the separation of powers and what conditions provoke instability and conflict? We draw on Madisonian political theory and research addressing the separation of powers in the United States to develop a game theoretical model of inter-institutional stability and conflict within a separation of powers system. Two factors emerge as catalysts for institutional instability and conflict among the branches of government: high-stakes institutional rivalry combined with uncertainty about the public’s relative support for various branches of government. We apply the model to the experience of Honduras in 2008–2009 that resulted in the coup ousting President Zelaya which illustrates the difficulty of developing credible checks and balances.

Keywords: checks and balances; consolidation of democracy; Honduras; separation of powers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:25:y:2013:i:1:p:105-127

DOI: 10.1177/0951629812453216

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