Performance when misinformation increases with experience

Amihai Glazer

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2013, vol. 25, issue 1, 63-74

Abstract: An official whose experience increases over time may overweight old information when making decisions. If the state of nature changes over time, the official’s performance eventually worsens with experience. Though a new official may initially perform worse than his predecessor, maximizing average performance requires that officials are regularly replaced.

Keywords: imperfect information; term limits; turnover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:25:y:2013:i:1:p:63-74

DOI: 10.1177/0951629812448237

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