The selection and signaling effects of third-party intervention

Yukari Iwanami

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2014, vol. 26, issue 1, 135-157

Abstract: Although mediation is one of the most widely used conflict management techniques, not all international conflicts involve mediation. Why do mediators intervene in some conflicts while not in others? Do third parties strategically select cases for mediation? How does their decision to intervene influence the outcome of international bargaining? This paper formally analyzes the initiation of mediation and the effect of third parties’ decisions of (non-)involvement on the likelihood of war. We find that informed mediators tend to avoid cases in which a disputant is resolute ( selection effect ); however, even such self-serving actions can reduce the likelihood of warfare by signaling the disputant’s intransigence to the other side and inducing the latter to make more concessions during bilateral bargaining ( signaling effect ). The Kargil War of 1999 illustrates this logic.

Keywords: Mediation; game theory; international conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629813493211 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:26:y:2014:i:1:p:135-157

DOI: 10.1177/0951629813493211

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().