Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating

Muhammet Bas, Curtis S Signorino and Taehee Whang
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Curtis S Signorino: Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA
Taehee Whang: Division of International Studies, Korea University, Seoul, Korea

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2014, vol. 26, issue 1, 3-34

Abstract: We generalize two classes of statistical sequential incomplete information games: (1) those resembling typical signaling games, in which a single agent represents each player, allowing for information to be revealed about future play; and (2) those in which each player is represented by a set of independent agents, where moves do not reveal private information. The generalized model we develop, the Correlated Agent Model , relies on a parameter, Ï , which denotes the correlation between two agents’ private information, i.e. the extent to which a player knows the future private component of her preferences. The independent agent and single agent models are special cases, where Ï =0 and Ï =1, respectively. The model also allows 0

Keywords: Correlated preferences; fully structure; strategic choice models; structural statistical models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:26:y:2014:i:1:p:3-34

DOI: 10.1177/0951629813482054

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