The role of oversight committees in closed rule legislation

Wim Van Gestel and Christophe Crombez
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Wim Van Gestel: Faculty of Economics and Business at KU Leuven, Belgium
Christophe Crombez: Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, USA; Faculty of Economics and Business at KU Leuven, Belgium

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2014, vol. 26, issue 4, 521-547

Abstract: We formulate a game-theoretical model of closed rule legislation in the presence of informational asymmetries. In the model an agenda setter with private information proposes a policy to a legislature. The legislature appoints an oversight committee to monitor the agenda setter. We study the rationale for this appointment, and analyze the equilibrium oversight committee member choices for the legislators. We conclude that it is optimal for the legislators to appoint oversight committee members who are as far from them as is the agenda setter, but in the opposite direction, rather than do the monitoring themselves. The appointment of such oversight committee members represents a credible means for the legislators to commit to reject proposals that they only marginally prefer to the status quo.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; delegation; European Union; oversight; trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:26:y:2014:i:4:p:521-547

DOI: 10.1177/0951629813507644

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