A strategic theory of effective monitoring arrangements for international institutions

Thania Sanchez and Johannes Urpelainen
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Thania Sanchez: Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Johannes Urpelainen: Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2014, vol. 26, issue 4, 599-628

Abstract: States often delegate compliance monitoring to international monitors. It is commomly assumed that these monitors will report accurately on the information they gather. However, the effectiveness of compliance monitors varies widely. Monitors may fail to collect information about non-compliance or even collude with non-compliant states and deliberately fail to report the information they gather. To explain this variation, we present a formal theory of how structural conditions and institutional designs lead to different levels of monitoring efficacy. We show that international institutions can improve monitoring by avoiding ruthless sanctions, and that intrinsically motivated monitors generally achieve better outcomes than neutral bureaucrats. Our theory contributes to the broad literature on international institutional design and treaty effectiveness.

Keywords: Compliance; enforcement; international institutions; monitoring; principal–agent models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:26:y:2014:i:4:p:599-628

DOI: 10.1177/0951629813511550

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