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Common property in the trust game: Experimental evidence from Bulgaria

Eric A Coleman

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2016, vol. 28, issue 1, 27-43

Abstract: The extent of human cooperation depends on the institutional arenas wherein people interact. Scholars from the Ostrom school have been particularly interested in how behavior in common property institutions differs from private property. Using a model of reciprocal motivations, I hypothesize that common property institutions elicit less cooperation than private property institutions in post-Communist Bulgaria. To investigate this hypothesis, this article reports on a series of experiments that examine the effects of common and private property in the trust game. The results indicate that common property institutions in Bulgaria elicit less cooperation than private property.

Keywords: Collective action; common property; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:28:y:2016:i:1:p:27-43